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The New Deal For Young People is the major welfare-to-work program in the UK. It is a
mandatory multistage policy targeted at the 18-24 year old unemployed. This paper investi-
gates the e®ectiveness of the program in terms of enhancing the (re)employment probability
of participant males. I exploit the eligibility rule to identify a suitable counterfactual relying
upon a simple regression discontinuity design. By exploiting such a discontinuity I am able
to non parametrically identify (Hahn et al., 2001) a local average treatment e®ect (LATE).
While relying upon the non parametric local linear regression method I am able to push
forward such a parameter to a \global" dimension, implicitly adding parametric structure.
No evidence of possible general equilibrium as well as substitution e®ects is found by a co-
hort speci¯c approach (before and after the program). The main result is that the program
enhances employability by about 6-7%.
JEL: J18, J23, J38, C14
Keywords: Labour market policy evaluation, regression discontinuity, non parametric.
1 Introduction
In the past decade there has been an increasing interest on labour market policies, especially on
the shift from bene¯ts to work. A number of welfare-to-work policies have been implemented
(Heckman et al., 1999; Boeri et al., 2000; Van Reenen, 2001; Blundell, 2002 ), some are targeted
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1towards particular groups: disadvantaged, youths, lone parents and so on. The framework of
such policies is generally twofold: ¯rst, bene¯ts are only provided to those who comply with the
requirements of the program and second, those requirements are normally aimed at improving
skills and employability. Such distinctive characteristics are shared by the policy I evaluate in
this work: the New Deal for Young People (NDYP) in the UK.
The NDYP is the major welfare-to-work program in the UK, about one million young britons
have been involved by December 2003, it is targeted at 18-24 year old1 unemployed (receiving
Job Seeker Allowance, JSA2) for at least 6 months. It is a mandatory multistage program
(Section, 2), where the sanction for non compliers is the withdrawal, at least temporarily, from
the bene¯t. The ¯rst part of the program (gateway) is devoted to intensive job search, followed
(if unsuccessful) by an option and eventually by a follow-through period (similar to the gateway,
but shorter). The natural aim of the policy is to improve employability both at the extensive
and intensive margins, while acquiring skills and motivation.
The program was launched in January 1998 in selected areas (pilot period) and extended to
the entire UK (national roll-out) by April of the same year. I do not intend to cover the pilot
period in this study. This has already been the topic of Blundell et al. (2004). They found
for males an average treatment e®ect of about 10%, in terms of (re)employment probability,
for the pilot group. Such estimate halved for the national roll out, however their data end
in July 1999. Their treatment is intended as job search assistance, the main component of
the gateway period, since the outcome of interest is de¯ned as (re)employment probability
within 4 months since entering the New Deal. While I de¯ne as treatment the whole program
consisting of job search assistance, training/education, subsidies and job experience (voluntary
sector or environmental services). I analyse the program in a long term perspective both from
the viewpoint of the outcome and the time interval considered. The identi¯cation structure
(Section, 3) imposes a minimal set of assumptions, consistently with the discontinuity design,
and the estimation relies on nonparametric local linear regression3.
According to politicians and program administrators we are looking at a success story in
roughly all its component. Here is part of a piece written by Andrew Smith (2004) the former
Secretary of State at the Department for Work and Pensions:
1Such an age bracket has been chosen for political and ¯nancial reasons. Before the implementation of the
policy some cost simulations have been done in order to set the age eligibility limit to 24 years instead of a
slightly older or younger age.
2JSA is the only unemployment insurance targeted at the group of interest in this work. In order to be eligible
the unemployed has to be willing and able to work (previous employment history is not required) and before
the introduction of the New Deal only weak requirements were imposed in order to receive JSA in principle
inde¯nitely.
3Blundell et al. (2004) rely on a di®erence in di®erence matching estimator.
2\The Government investment in the New Deal and Jobcentre Plus has helped to deliver one
of the most e®ective labour market programmes in the World....".
While a program participant states (www.newdeal.gov.uk):
\If it weren't for New Deal, I wouldn't be here now. They helped me and they pushed me
when I needed it. I've got a lot more con¯dence and I've got skills."
The main questions answered in this work are: is the policy really improving employment
prospects for young males? Are the e®ects of the policy lasting over di®erent cohorts?
The focus will be on the identi¯cation of the program e®ect on the (re)employment prob-
ability of participant males4. There are several potential outcomes of interest in this respect,
i.e. probability of being employed at some point in time or probability of gaining employment
in a given interval. I concentrate on the (re)employment probability within 18 months since
starting the JSA spell5, given 6 months of unemployment. Such an outcome allows to evaluate
the e®ectiveness of the entire program not distinguishing among di®erent type of treatments.
Here treatment is understood as being a combination of job search assistance, training, subsi-
dies and some work experience (voluntary sector or environmental services). However, concerns
may be raised on possible anticipation e®ects and behavioural changes due to the mere exis-
tence of the program. I.e., if the program is perceived as being able to signi¯cantly increase the
(re)employment probability it might produce a strong disincentive and a lower e®ort level since
it would be bene¯cial to wait in open unemployment and bene¯t from the program. This would
result in an upper bias in the estimate of the program e®ect given that the average treated
would be of better quality than otherwise. Some of the participants could have found a job
anyway. However, if such anticipation e®ects are relevant, it should be the case that the cost
of waiting, receiving JSA instead of a proper salary, is a decreasing function of unemployment
duration. It is quite costly6 to wait for 6 months in open unemployment. While it might not
be so costly to wait for a shorter period. Therefore, if an anticipation e®ect has to be noticed
it should be relevant in the last few weeks before the sixth month. However, I cannot ¯nd
evidence of such behaviour by looking at Figure 7, the survival functions do not present any
4The vast majority (75%) of participants are males. Furthermore, the NDYP is basically the only program
available to young males while there are other programs for females not easily distinguishable and therefore
source of potential identi¯cation problems.
5The starting date of the JSA should coincide with the start of the unemployment period. The 18 months
cuto® point is due to the fact that the control group I am going to exploit later on would enter an ALMP after 18
months in open unemployment. A shorter period would not consider those participants who take the education
and training option (Section, 2). For later cohorts, it might be that some of the controls had a previous spell in
the program. However, this would still be consistent but the estimated e®ect would be the e®ect of the program
at a given point in time.
6Even if stigma e®ects are discarded from the analysis. JSA is about 40 pounds per week while minimum
wage is 4.5 pounds per hour.
3sort of inducted behaviour at the tail and they are consistent with the same functions plotted
for a cohort before the program was launched7.
As standard in the evaluation literature the problem reduces to that of missing outcome
(Heckman et al, 1999; Blundell and Costa-Dias, 2000). A given individual cannot be in two
di®erent states at the same time. He/she is either in the program or out of it. Therefore I
have to identify a suitable missing counterfactual. In a non experimental study exercise, such
a problem is exacerbated due to the nonexistence of an administered control group and in the
speci¯c case due to the global implementation of the program: everyone in the UK who is
younger than 25 after 6 months in open unemployment is forced into the program.
In this work my approach (Section, 3) would be that of a Regression Discontinuity (RD)
design (Thistlethwaite and Campbell, 1960; Hahn et al, 2001). It seems to be rather appropriate
given the nature of the eligibility rule (six months of JSA, plus younger than 25). The intuition
behind such an approach is that participation changes according to a known deterministic
function at a discontinuity point. Unemployed slightly younger than 25 are in, while those
slightly older are out. There are not other di®erences, apart from the treatment status, between
treated and untreated in the neighborhood of the discontinuity8. This gives rise to a natural
comparison, nonparametrically recovering a Local Average Treatment E®ect parameter (LATE)
under a very weak assumption. The LATE parameter extends to the ATE in the case of constant
treatment e®ect or under particular smoothness conditions.
The data (Section, 4) for the analysis result from a combination of two datasets: the New
Deal Evaluation Database (NDED), containing a very detailed set of information on virtually
all participants and no information on controls, and the JUVOS data, a 5% sample of all un-
employed claiming JSA in the UK. JUVOS contains information, on both treated and controls,
such as: start and end date of JSA spell, occupation, date of birth. The NDED is meant to
complement the JUVOS where the latter fails to have adequate information on exit from JSA
as explained in Section 4.
Consistently with the non parametric identi¯cation strategy, the estimation (Section, 5) is
implemented by Local Linear Regression (LLR) known to have desirable boundary properties
(Fan, 1992; Porter, 2003). I am ultimately estimating at a boundary point, where the size of
7If anything there is a limited, not signi¯cant, evidence that potential treated (after the program) tend to
leave unemployment at an higher rate in the last 15/20 days before the sixth month, therefore reinforcing the
estimates. A similar analysis has also been performed for the control group, given the existence of the above
mentioned program after 18 months in open unemployment. Also in this case there is no evidence of anticipatory
behaviours, such results are available from the author upon request.
8Near the cuto® point the RD design mimics a random assignment and it is often referred to as a quasi-
experimental method (Hahn et al., 2001; Porter, 2003).
4the discontinuity is the parameter of interest. The di®erence between the two conditional mean
functions from both sides of the discontinuity will recover the LATE. A simple Montecarlo study
(Section, 6) is performed in order to con¯rm the appropriateness of the estimator proposed.
A ¯rst glance of the strategy and results can be given by plotting the conditional mean
functions ((re)employment probability by age) for several quarterly cohorts before and after
the implementation of the program. In Figure 4 it is clearly visible that before the program
the line is fairly smooth and consistent with the hypothesis of continuity of the non-program
outcome, while in Figures 5 and 6 the same function exhibits a relevant discontinuity post-
program exactly according to the eligibility rule. Those individual to the left of the discontinuity
(treated) have a higher chance of gaining employment. The local parameter is of interest to
policy makers on its own right, it de¯nes the causal impact of the program on those individuals
who are in the neighborhood of the cuto® point. Furthermore, it might be \the" parameter of
interest if the idea under scrutiny is that of extending the policy marginally (to a slightly older
group). However, I will try to give a more extensive interpretation of the ¯ndings relying upon
the non parametric function arising from the estimates before and after the program. In so
doing I will impose more structure to the problem and therefore lose the fully non parametric
identi¯cation. In addition, I will follow a cohort speci¯c approach. Blundell et al. (2004) found
a signi¯cant e®ect of the program of about 10% for the pilot period, which almost halved for
the national roll-out. It is therefore interesting to check whether the program has had only an
initial e®ect due to die out over time. Such an approach will also give some crude evidence on
the relevance of general equilibrium e®ects.
Almost by de¯nition the RD method derives its appeal by the a priori consideration that
control and treatment units are almost identical near the discontinuity, suggesting a high degree
of substitutability. If the program has the e®ect of substituting treated for control units the
estimates would be biased upwards. This concern mainly arises from the subsidised employment
option9, it might render treated cheaper than controls and therefore could displace the latter
for the former. Nevertheless, Katz (1998) found that in a similar program the take-up rate for
the subsidy is rather low and its employment impact negligible when left alone. In a targeted
program, as the NDYP, receiving a subsidy can place a signi¯cant stigma on the participant.
He is only employable thanks to the subsidy, otherwise he would have not found a job.
On the other hand relevant general equilibrium e®ects, i.e. increase in labour supply lowering
equilibrium wages, would push employment up for treated and controls. It might also be that
9It is worth mentioning that such displacement might also arise from enhanced job search. However, in this
respect it might simply be that the matching function is improved, vacancies are ¯lled in more e±ciently, without
a®ecting the outcome of the control groups.
5improved macroeconomic conditions, general equilibrium and substitution e®ects could roughly
cancel out each other. I will devote part of this work to the investigation of such side e®ects. The
rest of the paper is organised as follows: Section 2 describes various features of the program;
Section 3 covers the identi¯cation strategy adopted; 4 carefully describes the data used; 5
describes the estimation strategy; 6 provides some montecarlo evidence on the performance of
the estimator; 7 presents the results; 8 addresses the substitution puzzle and 9 concludes.
2 The Program
As from Figure 1 the NDYP is a sequential program, where di®erent treatments are o®ered to
the participants. Following a period of six months10 in \open" unemployment 18 to 24 year
old (JSA recipients) are forced into the program in order to be still eligible for the bene¯t. It
is therefore a mandatory policy administered to everyone in the UK who, after six months of
unemployment, are aged between 18 and 24.
The ¯rst four months (Gateway period) are (nominally11) devoted to intensive job search
assistance and some basic skill training, eg. CV writing. Participants are obliged to meet a
personal mentor once every two weeks and they have to report and prove the actions taken in
order to gain employment. Such actions typically consist of applications, direct contact between
possible employers and caseworker, etc..
While in the gateway the participant receives a bene¯t equal to the JSA (about 40 pounds
per week). If a regular job is not found during the gateway, a second phase follows: the options.
On the basis of personal considerations, given individual characteristics, the caseworker agrees
with the participant on the option to be taken12. The option period can last from 6 to 12
months (full time training or education); such second stage is compulsory as well. Common
practice among units of delivery was to try placing the unemployed in a subsidised job during
the second month of treatment. In case of a subsidised employment, the treated receives the
salary paid by the employer who gets, for a maximum of six months, a subsidy of 60 pounds
per week plus 750 pounds as a one-o® payment for the compulsory (minimum) one day a week
training to be provided13. The second option, education or training, is targeted at youths
10Only a very small number of unemployed, not included in the analysis, can access the program earlier than
the sixth month. This particular group is composed by ex-o®enders, disable and unemployed lacking very basic
skills (writing and reading di±culties).
11Nervertheless, in the data, some individuals enter an option during the gateway period. The ¯rst guidelines
given by the government stated clearly that one could exit the gateway period only toward a regular job. Later,
they were adjusted according to the de facto behaviour.
12This is not always the case since certain units of delivery tend to favour a particular option.
13Such subsidy seems quite generous when compared to the sort of hourly rate (close to the minimum wage)
a typical participant would get. In a crude computation, the weekly subsidy plus the one-o® payment would
6lacking basic skills. It can last up to 12 months; while attending such courses the unemployed
still receives his JSA payment. A third option is that of a voluntary sector job where the
participant receives an amount at least identical to the JSA plus 400 pounds spread over the
six months. The same monetary treatment is granted in the fourth option: Environmental Task
Force, basically a governmental job, meant to be the last possible placement. Participant are
allocated to these last two options in the third and fourth month of the gateway. Eventually a
third phase follows: the follow-through, essentially maximum of 13 weeks similar to the initial
gateway. It consists of intensive job search as well as training courses to maintain the skills
acquired during the option period. The program was launched in January 1998 in selected
areas (pilot period) and was extended to the rest of the nation in April of that year (national
roll-out). The program has involved about 1 million young britons by December 2003, of which
roughly 75% are males.
As mentioned earlier the aim of this work is to quantify the long run impact of the program
in terms of (re)employment probability. The outcome of interest is de¯ned as a treatment
e®ect in the \Black box" (the shaded area in Figure 1). This is because I do not distinguish
among di®erent stages of the program (gateway or options), but I concentrate on the e®ect of
the program as a whole. The outcome of interest is the (re)employment probability within 18
months since qualifying for JSA (basically, becoming unemployed)14. The choice of such an
outcome is determined by the interest in long run e®ects of the program, while short run e®ects
have already been investigated. The 18 months limit arises from the fact that unemployed
older than 25 are forced in a similar program (New Deal for Long Term Unemployed) after 18
months of open unemployment. The latter would make a comparison on a longer time interval
misleading.
Another important aspect to notice is that the program is one of global implementation
and therefore there could be concerns about possible general equilibrium e®ects, dictated by
the increase in the overall labour supply, denied by a partial equilibrium approach. However, if
such e®ects are relevant they should be increasingly so as the program broadens and involves
more and more individuals. I tackle this issue relying upon a cohort speci¯c approach, namely
I analyse the impact of the program for ¯fteen quarterly cohorts entering the program from
amount to about 50% of a weekly pay for a minimum wage worker, however the 750 pounds would have to repay
for the loss of production due to the minimum of one day training. Under very simple assumptions (perfectly
competitive markets) those 750 pounds would not be enough to compensate for that loss. In fact, taking the
latter into account the subsidy would not be greater than 30%, but still generous though. However, job turnover
could be itself quite costly making such an option not as appealing as it looks like at a ¯rst glance. This point
seems to be con¯rmed by the low take up rate in the data, only a sixth of those entering an option would go for
the subsidised job.
14Given at least 6 months of JSA, such condition is necessary to de¯ne program participation.
7April 1998 to December 200115. An initial test of the importance of general equilibrium e®ects
is given by the simple time path of the program impacts. On the other hand I have also to
consider possible substitution e®ects, if 18-24 year old are good substitute for 25-30 then we
should see the former replacing the latter and therefore the program e®ect would be ampli¯ed
by the substitution e®ect violating then the hypothesis according to which the non-treatment
state is synonymous for non program state (SUTVA). I approach this potential source of bias
by looking at treated and controls before and after the program as well as by comparing 31-36
to 25-30 year old before and after the program (Sections 3, 8).
3 Identi¯cation Strategy
As explained in the previous sections, participation in the program is compulsory and estab-
lished by a deterministic rule: six months of JSA plus younger than 25. This gives an immediate
comparison group or a so called \sharp" Regression Discontinuity (RD) design (Thistlethwayte
and Campbell, 1960; Hahn et al, 2001) where the discontinuity in the treatment is given by the
age rule informing the program. The RD approach is a quasi-experimental design where the
known discontinuity is exploited for identi¯cation. If we believe that without the program indi-
viduals in the neighborhood of 25 years will perform the same, this allows to identify the e®ect
of the program at least for those near the discontinuity under a local continuity assumption.
In a very simple chart the treatment function in a \sharp" RD design would look something
like Figure 2.
Though it is quite often the case, i.e. geographic boundaries or eligibility rules, that policy
designs give rise to some sort of discontinuity in the treatment function such an approach has
not been used so often for evaluation purposes (Hahn et al, 2001). The advantage of such
a method relies on the minimal set of assumptions required for the identi¯cation of a Local
Average Treatment E®ect (LATE) parameter16.
Formally, let D be the program participation status. D = 1 for participants, D = 0
for non-participants. (Y 1;Y 0) be two potential outcomes, resulting from participation/non-
participation respectively and Y = Y 0 + D(Y 1 ¡ Y 0) the observed outcome. The impact
from participation is de¯ned as ¯ = Y 1 ¡ Y 0. The eligibility rule D = 1(A < a) is a known
deterministic step function of A (age, continuous) and steps from 1 to 0 at a (25 years).
15This limit is imposed by the available data.
16The LATE can be on its own right an interesting parameter or even `the' parameter of interest if the idea
under scrutiny is that of extending the program marginally or to capture the e®ect of the program on the
particular subgroup. Obviously the LATE does not translate into an ATE unless constant treatment e®ect is
assumed or under some particular smoothness conditions.
8Taking the mean outcome di®erence for those marginally below (a¡) and above (a+) the
threshold a:




ASSUMPTION(1): E[Y 0jA] continuous at a. Then the mean program e®ect on the treated
E[¯ja¡] = E[Y ja¡] ¡ E[Y ja+] (2)
is identi¯ed in the neighborhood of the threshold a.
However, I might observe Y 2 (non treated outcome) instead of Y 0 (non program outcome)
since there might be substitution e®ects17, treated might substitute controls at the threshold
because they might be \cheaper".
Replacing Y 2 to Y 0 in the observed outcome and proceeding as before, instead of (2), by
adding and subtracting the same quantity (ASSUMPTION (1)), I get:
E[Y ja¡] ¡ E[Y ja+] = E[Y 1ja¡] ¡ E[Y 0ja¡]
| {z }
E[¯ja¡]




Where E[¯ja¡] is the parameter of interest and SB the substitution bias. The substitution bias
is potentially important if the subsidised employment option has a large take-up and if treated
are e®ectively cheaper than controls. However, I can provide some evidence on the absence of
any substitution bias.
By considering a cohort approach. Let me rewrite (3) as:
E(Y ja¡;c) ¡ E(Y ja+;c) = E(Y 1ja¡;c) ¡ E(Y 0ja¡;c) + E(Y 0ja+;c) ¡ E(Y 2ja+;c)
where c is a cohort after the program. Let me rewrite E(Y 2ja+;c) = E(Y 0ja+;c) ¡ SB
and assuming: ASSUMPTION(2a): E(Y 0ja+;c) = E(Y 0ja+;c0) where c0 is a cohort before the
program. If E(Y 0ja+;c0) = E(Y 2ja+;c) ! SB = 0. And E[¯ja¡] is identi¯ed.
It remains to justify why cohort c0 is not a®ected by substitution. There are a number of
reasons why this might be the case. Cohort c0 is obviously taken before the program started,
17I left aside the discussion on possible general equilibrium e®ects because for the parameter I am identifying
those e®ects should not be relevant. In the neighborhood of the discontinuity, even if there is an increase in
labour supply (given the number of participant involved) easing the wage pressure and the equilibrium wage,
such an e®ect should be common to treated and untreated and therefore should roughly cancel out.
9the last cohort prior to the program will be the most similar to the one after the program given
the economic environment. However, since the outcome I am considering spans over a year
after the 6 months of unemployment, c0 could in principle compete with cohort c and some of
the others. In fact, substitution happens in the ¯rst 4 months of treatment, through subsidised
placement, among similar individuals, if treated are cheaper than non treated, but for these two
cohorts there are not similar individuals, since those in cohort c0 have a di®erent unemployment
duration then those in cohort c when they are supposed to compete for the same job.
Another way to deal with the possible substitution bias is that of using as a reference group
that of the slightly older otherwise identical unemployed. Namely, let me consider the 31 to 36
year old who should be pretty similar to the 25 to 30 year old but de¯nitely a di®erent group
with respect to the 19-24. The slightly older should not be a®ected by substitution. Let me
rewrite E(Y 2ja+) = E(Y 0ja+) ¡ SB. The crucial assumption would be ASSUMPTION(2b):
E(Y 0ja+) = E(Y 0ja+
1 ) where a+
1 = 31+. Again, if E(Y 0ja+
1 ) = E(Y 2ja+) ! SB = 0. And
E[¯ja¡] is identi¯ed.
4 Data
A ready made dataset does not exists for the purposes of this work. However, it is still possible
to recover most of the information needed by combining an administrative dataset (New Deal
Evaluation Database, NDED) purposely built and containing virtually all participants, and
the publicly available 5% longitudinal sample of UK unemployed (JUVOS). In the latter, it
is possible to identify treated and control group looking at the eligibility rule. It is known
that 18-24 year old receiving JSA for 6 months constitute the eligible and almost entirely
treated population. The JUVOS dataset contains date of birth, geographical region of residence,
starting and end date of JSA spell, gender, usual and sought occupation and destination on exit
from JSA, but has no information after the end of the JSA spell. There are a number of exit
categories recorded: found a job, other bene¯t, retired, prison, attending court and education
and training. The last two exits are one of the option of the NDYP while no equivalent exists
for the control group, at least in the time interval considered. The controls who exit JSA for
such destinations are almost certainly involved in small scale programs or simply decided on
their own to acquire some training or education. In fact, such exit has half of the relevance
for controls compared to treated. Given the presence of such exit categories and the structure
of the JUVOS data I would not know whether an unemployed (whose reason for ending the
JSA spell is training or education) will ¯nd a job within the relevant period. Therefore, for
10such observations I have to complement the JUVOS data with the administrative data set
(NDED). The NDED contains a number of extremely detailed information on participants,
i.e. date of entry and termination of New Deal spell, date of birth, region of residence, unit
of delivery, type of actions taken to ¯nd a job, number of letters sent to potential employers,
option attended, status after ending the treatment, reasons for leaving the New Deal and so on.
From the NDED, I can recover the exact18 exit rates to employment for participants (in the
particular period of interest). Therefore by using this complementary information, I can input
such exit rates for the treated in the JUVOS data. An example might be helpful in clarifying
this point, suppose some treated (identi¯ed in the JUVOS data) end their JSA spell to improve
their education or attend some training (education/training option) I would not know, from
JUVOS only, whether they found a job within 18 months since their JSA experience started.
However, I can get such information from the NDED, where I know exactly how many of them
actually found a job in such a time interval and I can therefore input such information to the
JUVOS data. Unfortunately, such a complementary information is not available for the control
group, no controls are included in the NDED, however I can still de¯ne three di®erent estimates
of the parameter of interest by hypothesizing three alternative scenarios:
1. symmetric exit rates by age and cohorts for treated and controls;
2. all controls, who enrol into a training/education program in the time interval of interest,
get a job in the time horizon considered;
3. none of the controls who attended some education/training course get a regular job by
the time interval of interest.
These strategies will allow to de¯ne a best estimate, a lower and an upper bound respectively.
In order to avoid the inclusion of high-school kids 18 year old will be discarded from the
analysis. I de¯ne ¯fteen quarterly cohorts, according to the date of entry in the program,
spanning from April 1998 to December 2001 (Table, 1). Each cohort counts approximately a
thousand observations or more and coherently with the RD design there is almost an identical
number of treated and controls in each one. As written earlier the key of the identi¯cation relies
on the discontinuity in the participation rule and on the apriori belief that in the neighborhood
of such point unemployed are almost identical but for the treatment status. Such belief can
be con¯rmed by looking at the occupational (usual and sought) distribution in the proximity
of the discontinuity (Tables, 2 and 3). The narrower is the age interval considered the more
similar are the distributions.
18As mentioned the NDED records information on all participants.
115 Estimation
The estimation of the parameter of interest is performed nonparametrically by Local Linear
Regression (LLR)19. The LLR method consists in running several local linear weighted regres-
sions where the weights are assigned according to a kernel function (satisfying some regularity
conditions) and a bandwidth. In general, observations close to the estimation point are given
larger weights while decreasing weights are assigned to those further away. The estimation in
an RD design boils down to estimating at a boundary point, where y¡ and y+ are estimated
using observations from the left and right of the discontinuity respectively. The estimate of y¡
is given by ^ ®:
(^ ®; ^ ¯) ´ argmin®;¯
n X
i=1






Where K(:) is the Kernel function and h an appropriate bandwidth. It is a known result that
constant kernel methods have poor boundary performances due to the lack of observations on
one side of the boundary. Such a problem could even be exacerbated in the current context,
given that I would compound the bias from both sides of the discontinuity. The LLR method
proposed attains the optimal convergence rate due to the local linear approximation (Porter,
(2003)) under fairly weak assumptions. A standard issue in nonparametric kernel or polynomial
methods is that of choosing the \appropriate" bandwidth, or complexity of the model (Fan and
Gjibels, (1996)), there is an obvious trade-o® between bias and variance of the estimators in
such context determined by the choice of the smoothing parameter. A too small bandwidth
would cause an increase in the variance and might capture too much of the noise in the data,
reducing to a simple interpolation of the data. On the other hand a large bandwidth would
oversmooth the data, denying important features of the underlying data generating process.
Such issue is resolved here by a direct plugin method for LLR elaborated in Rupert et al.
(1995) (see Table 6, and a sensitivity analysis is performed to ensure the robustness of the
results obtained20. The last estimation step reduces to applying the LLR to the left and right
of the discontinuity and taking the di®erence of the two conditional mean functions estimated.
19Fan, (1992).
20All estimations are also performed according to a rule-of-thumb as in Rupert et al. (1995) and to hs =
1:06^ ¾n
¡:2, Silverman's rule, and half and twice hrot. Naturally, the Silverman's rule is not suited for the LLR
but it has been used only for a robustness check. The parameter estimates vary very little whatever selection
criterion is adopted. Complete set of results is available from the author on request.
12Standard errors have been obtained by bootstrap (300 replications21) for each cohort and for
the whole sample.
6 Montecarlo Study
In this section I implement a simple montecarlo study on the performance of the estimator
employed in the paper (¯RD) comparing it with a simple OLS (¯OLS) on the whole sample and
a Wald estimator (¯W) on 10% of data around the discontinuity. The size of the discontinuity to
be estimated is given in the Table 4 as ¯ while the data generating process is y = m(x)+¯D(x <
:5)+². Where x » U[0;1], ² » N(0;¾2
²) (¾² given in Table 4) and © is the standard normal cdf.




x gives an indication of the complexity of the estimation. The study
is based on 500 replications and performed for two di®erent sample sizes (n = 1000;3000). The
bandwidth is chosen, as in the paper, according to a direct plugin method. The montecarlo
evidence suggests a clear superiority of the proposed estimator in terms of precision with respect
to the proposed Wald estimator22. The point estimates are quite precise. Comparing the order
of the bias involved in the use of the Wald estimator as de¯ned in the experiments gives striking
results: it goes from 3 to more than 170 times.
The simple intuition on the quality of the estimates obtained by LLR relies upon the locality
of the latter. When the underlying function giving rise to the discontinuity is still quite regular
but characterised by a highly non linear behaviour ¯tting a local constant in the proximity of
the discontinuity or a straight line on the whole sample is not a great idea. On the other hand,
the decision to use a Wald estimator on 10% of the observation in the neighborhood of the
discontinuity is arbitrary, I could have proposed di®erent candidates all of which would still be
based on an arbitrary selection method. In this respect, the advantage of the LLR estimator
applied at the discontinuity point is due to the fact that the bandwidth is selected according
to a consistent and objective criterion. It arises from the data generating process itself and
therefore more reliable and accountable than in the former case.
7 Results
It is possible to summarize the results by referring to Table 5, where I present three sets
of estimates named Best, Lower and Upper. As explained in Section 4 the three di®erent
21The number of replications has been limited to 300 after few checks on the stability of the results. The
estimation process for the ¯gures produced in Table 5 takes about two weeks on a powerful server.
22The comparison with the OLS on the entire sample is per se not that meaningful given the idea behind the
RD design.
13sets of estimates derive from the fact that I had to \construct" three alternative scenarios
given the available data. It is possible to recover the exit rates to employment for those
participants who went through the education and training option (about 35% of those who took
an option or about 15% of total participants) but for the lack of information on unemployed
older than 25 who had left the JUVOS dataset for some training or education I have to rely
on some assumptions. The \best" estimates assume exactly the same exit rates for treated
and controls when the recorded exit from JUVOS is education and training. This could itself
be a lower bound since treated should be expected to have a higher (re)employment chance
from that option, given more structured courses o®ered. The second scenario \lower" relies on
the assumption that all controls, who attended some training/education course, found a job in
the reference period. It therefore quali¯es as an extreme lower bound. In the third scenario,
\upper", none of the controls found a job in the reference period, which seems to be an extreme
in the other sense. Analysing the parameter estimates it does not appear that the program
e®ect is dying out, in fact it seems to be rather stable (Table 5) even after more than three years
it has been launched. On average over the 15 cohorts it is possible to estimate a very precise
parameter of about 6-7%. The time pro¯le of the estimates does not seem to suggest relevant
general equilibrium e®ects with possible di®erential impacts on the two groups (at least in local
terms). This point is also con¯rmed by looking at the (re)employment probability for the two
groups separately, they do not vary much and certainly not to be consistent with large general
equilibrium e®ects23.
On the other hand substitution does not seem to be relevant either. In case of large sub-
stitution e®ect we should see in the conditional mean functions a behaviour similar to Figure
3. The closer to the discontinuity the more substitutable individuals should be and therefore
at the discontinuity the distance between the (re)employment probabilities should be larger.
However, this is not the case given Figures 5 and 6; on both sides of the discontinuity the
functions are almost completely °at. This suggests, combined with Figure 4 ((re)employment
probability before the program), a \global" interpretation of the parameter estimates. How-
ever, such an extended interpretation obviously implies a stronger identi¯cation structure (i.e.
constant treatment e®ect or particular smoothness). A test on the di®erence between the two
non treated outcome before and after the program is also performed formally and in Figure 8,
the null cannot be rejected. Such result is also con¯rmed by Figure 9, where the survival func-
tions for 25-30 and 31-36 year old are plotted against each other before and after the program
and they cannot be told apart at the conventional signi¯cance levels.
23Those ¯gures are available from the author upon request.
14The lack of evidence of general equilibrium and substitution e®ects can be explained by a
number of factors. Firstly, the sort of general equilibrium e®ects I have in mind, arising from
an increase in the labour supply lowering the equilibrium wage, require a substantial rise in the
overall supply of labour, however, though the implementation of the program is global, it is
not so massive to a®ect in a signi¯cant way the overall supply in the UK (Figures 10 and 11).
As far as the substitution is concerned, it requires that treated individuals are cheaper than
untreated, but this might not be the case if the cost of turnover is relatively high. Furthermore,
treated are cheaper only in the case of the subsidised employment option, but the take-up rate
of such a feature of the program is surprisingly low24. In fact only one over six treated who
went through the option stage were allocated in a subsidised job adding to less than 7% of the
new dealers. I have not covered possible general equilibrium e®ects arising from distortionary
taxes devolved to the funding of the program for the simple reason that the program has been
funded through the revenues from the privatisation processes initiated in those years.
8 Is There a Substitution Puzzle?
As mentioned throughout the paper the relevance of possible substitution e®ect between treated
and control individuals is central to the identi¯cation structure. The program I consider here
has a particular feature (subsidised employment option) that could raise concerns regarding the
violation of the SUTVA and therefore the validity of the identi¯cation strategy25. I have spent
a considerable part of the work trying to assess such an issue, and I do not ¯nd support for
any major concern on the evaluation exercise I propose. Why is it then that there is not any
substitution e®ect? In principle, the presence of a signi¯cant subsidy to employment should
generate an incentive to substitute workers. Is the subsidy given to participants enough to
create such an e®ect? As explained earlier, by comparing the sort of hourly rate participants
should get to the amount of the subsidy granted (weekly plus one o® payments) this add up to
about 50% of the salary in the 6 months period for which such subsidy could last for. However,
when considering the relevance of the subsidy there are few more things to be accounted for.
Firstly, the one o® payment has to cover the minimum one day per week of training participants
must receive. On its own this would notably lower the previous percentage to 30%. Secondly,
the subsidy only last for 6 months and might not be enough to compensate for the turnover
24Even the program administrators were surprised by such a low take up.
25It is worth mentioning that such displacement might also arises from enhanced job search. However, in this
respect it might simply be that the matching function is improved, vacancies are ¯lled in more e±ciently, without
a®ecting the outcome of the control groups.
15costs. Thirdly, in a targeted program, as the one considered here, there might be an important
stigma e®ect (Katz, 1998) attached to receiving a subsidy. The only way such a participant is
able to get a job is through a discount on the wage received. He is probably not as productive
as someone else in the population and while the subsidy could help him getting a job, it would
signal to the market his bad type. These are three potential explanations on the absence of
relevant substitution e®ects in the particular program under scrutiny. Are they convincing?
I should now go back to the evidence. The very low take up rate for such an option (only
16% of participants who actually went through an option) was surprising even to the program
administrators who were expecting a much higher one. The amount of evidence put forward in
this respect seems to be clear cut in excluding relevant substitution bias (Figures 5, 6, 8 and
9). Either comparing cohorts of controls before and after the program, the actual outcomes
in terms of employment probability with a prediction of how they should look like in case of
any relevant substitution e®ect or, ¯nally, comparing the control groups with a slightly older
counterparts I do not ¯nd any important substitution pattern.
9 Conclusions
This paper evaluates, in a long-run perspective, the (re)employment e®ect of the major welfare-
to-work policy in the UK: the New Deal for Young People (NDYP). The NDYP is a mandatory
multistage program where treatments span from job search assistance at a ¯rst stance, to
training, education, subsidy and reinstatement in the labour market through voluntary sector
or environmental services. Throughout the paper treatment is intended as a combination of the
above mentioned and therefore de¯ned as a \black-box", whose opening is delayed to future
research.
Under a minimal set of assumptions, consistently with the discontinuity design approach
adopted, I identi¯ed a local treatment e®ect for males of about 6-7% using data on those
individuals who entered the program from April 1998 to December 2001. Such an estimate, of
interest on its own right, could, given the non parametric estimates of the conditional mean
functions, be given a \global" dimension. However, this would imply the loss of the fully non
parametric identi¯cation. Side e®ects of the program have also been investigated in order to
con¯rm the robustness of the results. A large program can have general equilibrium e®ects
on wages via the possible increase in labour supply. On the other hand, given that one of the
treatment is a subsidy this may induce a certain degree of displacement of untreated individuals
if they are e®ectively more costly than treated. This is especially true the more similar those
16two groups of individuals are. In case of a substantial substitution the parameter estimated
would be biased upwards. However, I do not ¯nd any evidence of substitution and general
equilibrium e®ects. Few indirect tests are produced in this sense thanks to a cohort speci¯c
approach adopted in the analysis.
The positive impact of the program, in fact one of the few examples of an e®ective welfare-
to-work policy, probably arises, in part, from the nature of the treated individuals. Those
are young unemployed not particularly disadvantaged and besides a six months unemployment
spell for such an age group is not that uncommon.
It has also been shown (van Den Berg et al., 2004) that policies where non compliers incur
signi¯cant sanctions are on a theoretical and empirical ground capable of producing bene¯cial
e®ects in terms of employment, for the simple fact that they push up the level of e®ort exerted
by the unemployed. The mechanism being quite intuitive a worse outside option (withdrawal
of the bene¯t) constitutes a large incentive. Katz (1998) in reviewing di®erent ALMPs found
that policies combining wage subsidies with job development, training and job search assistance
appear to have been somewhat successful in improving the employment and earnings of speci¯c
targeted disadvantaged groups.
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18Table 1: Quarterly Cohorts. Treated 19-24, Controls 25-30 years old
Treated Control Total
Apr.-June '98 1,553 1,406 2,959
July-Sept. 1,486 1,345 2,831
Oct.-Dec. 1,217 1,165 2,382
Jan.-Mar. '99 1,458 1,342 2,800
Apr-June 1,480 1,334 2,814
July-Sept 1,323 1,280 2,603
Oct.-Dec. 1,059 1,098 2,157
Jan.-Mar. '00 1,450 1,263 2,713
Apr-June 1,376 1,202 2,578
July-Sept 1,197 1,026 2,223
Oct.-Dec. 970 957 1,927
Jan.-Mar. '01 1,144 1,055 2,199
Apr-June 1,279 1,119 2,398
July-Sept 1,109 935 2,044
Oct.-Dec. 894 856 1,750
Total 18,995 17,383 36,378
Table 2: Usual Occupation by Treatment Status (%)
and Age Bracket
Usual occupation 19-30 22-27 24-25
Treated Control Treated Control Treated Control
Managers 1.04 1.96 1.64 1.87 2.10 1.78
Professional 0.92 2.08 1.35 2.25 1.39 2.16
Associate Prof., Technical 3.80 5.19 4.59 5.62 5.34 5.76
Admn. Secretarial 13.65 10.94 13.23 11.41 12.02 11.13
Skilled trades 11.91 14.17 12.62 13.22 13.91 12.65
Personal Service 5.66 5.05 5.69 5.19 5.59 5.76
Sales and Customer service 8.62 4.78 7.15 5.47 6.98 5.60
Process, Plant and Mach. operatives 8.56 11.63 9.06 10.92 9.79 10.75
Elementary occupation 45.83 44.19 44.66 44.05 42.88 44.41
19Table 3: Sought Occupation by Treatment Status (%)
and Age Bracket
Sought occupation 19-30 22-27 24-25
Treated Control Treated Control Treated Control
Managers 1.35 2.01 2.23 2.04 2.61 2.10
Professional 1.29 2.40 1.86 2.69 2.28 2.53
Associate Prof., Technical 4.93 6.26 5.87 6.94 6.06 7.43
Admn. Secretarial 15.06 11.58 14.53 12.40 13.67 12.23
Skilled trades 12.73 14.26 12.77 13.25 13.34 12.61
Personal Service 5.94 5.07 5.86 5.09 5.98 4.90
Sales and Customer service 9.48 5.49 7.93 5.91 7.69 6.22
Process, Plant and Mach. operatives 8.41 12.18 9.25 11.15 9.64 11.08
Elementary occupation 40.82 40.75 39.70 40.54 38.72 40.89
Table 4: Montecarlo Experiments
m(x) ¯ ¾² noise/signal ^ ¯RD SE ^ ¯OLS SE ^ ¯a
W SE
:4x + :2x2 ¡ :7x3 + :1x4 .1 .1 .14
n=1000 .0928 .0330 .0963 .0162 .1301 .0207
n=3000 .0917 .0215 .0958 .0093 .1243 .0118
:5sin(6x) .1 .1 .06
n=1000 .1110 .0338 .6824 .0231 .5826 .0163
n=3000 .0972 .0127 .6799 .0130 .5938 .0097
©(:5sin(6x)) .1 .1 .28
n=1000 .1046 .0133 .3217 .0088 .1582 .009
n=3000 .0990 .0086 .3197 .005 .1549 .005
exp(x:2) + :5sin(6x) .1 .1 .13
n=1000 .1019 .0333 .7457 .0293 .1428 .0347
n=3000 .0949 .0216 .7509 .0167 .1291 .0183
Note: a) Wald estimator takes only observations between .45 and .55.
20Table 5: Treatment E®ects (and Bounds), Bandwidth: Direct Plugin
Best Lower Upper
Cohort E®ect Std.Err. E®ect Std.Err. E®ect Std.Err.
Apr.-June '98 .0872 (.0346) .0336 (.0323) .1166 (.0336)
July-Sept. .0936 (.0380) .0372 (.0356) .1366 (.0397)
Oct.-Dec. .0294 (.0390) -.0015 (.0372) .0784 (.0418)
Jan.-Mar. '99 .0787 (.0384) .0303 (.0394) .1365 (.0391)
Apr-June .1126 (.0380) .0327 (.0318) .1808 (.0404)
July-Sept .0742 (.0358) .0458 (.0362) .1389 (.0353)
Oct.-Dec. .0093 (.0412) -.0536 (.0396) .0817 (.0444)
Jan.-Mar. '00 .0254 (.0371) .0045 (.0366) .0620 (.0376)
Apr-June .0227 (.0361) -.0478 (.0339) .0680 (.0390)
July-Sept .0981 (.0394) .0464 (.0356) .1750 (.0384)
Oct.-Dec. .0231 (.0437) .0026 (.0415) .0683 (.0409)
Jan.-Mar. '01 .0032 (.0382) -.0362 (.0363) .0425 (.0389)
Apr-June .1256 (.0396) .0728 (.0370) .1760 (.0376)
July-Sept .0653 (.0408) -.015 (.0407) .1222 (.0405)
Oct.-Dec. .1172 (.0489) .0519 (.0500) .1415 (.0497)
All .0645 (.0104) .0150 (.0104) .1154 (.0109)
Note: Results based on bootstrapping 300 replications.
Table 6: Bandwidth: Direct Plugin
Best Lower Upper
Cohort Treated Control Treated Control Treated Control
Apr.-June '98 0.5792 0.3952 0.6420 0.4790 0.5927 0.4089
July-Sept. 0.6617 0.8908 0.7823 0.7088 0.5507 1.0079
Oct.-Dec. 0.5895 0.5861 0.6871 0.6406 0.9186 0.8052
Jan.-Mar. '99 0.6278 0.5965 0.9147 0.4200 0.5400 0.8553
Apr-June 0.4882 0.5285 0.5235 1.0403 0.5335 0.6900
July-Sept 0.7054 0.3623 0.6360 0.4120 0.6833 0.4295
Oct.-Dec. 0.6709 0.5584 0.8927 0.5853 0.4956 0.4877
Jan.-Mar. '00 1.0209 0.3853 1.1799 1.3131 0.6968 0.4073
Apr-June 0.7158 0.4590 0.5651 0.4014 0.5308 0.4173
July-Sept 0.5678 0.4505 0.4287 0.4686 0.4385 0.4150
Oct.-Dec. 0.7938 0.4863 0.5413 0.4092 0.6336 0.4789
Jan.-Mar. '01 0.5966 0.3803 0.4718 0.4846 0.4706 0.5355
Apr-June 0.4187 0.4103 0.4260 0.4305 0.4160 0.3960
July-Sept 0.5264 0.3493 0.5938 0.1371 0.5908 0.4113
Oct.-Dec. 0.7307 0.6288 0.5592 0.7961 0.7662 0.9806
All 0.4449 0.4581 0.5004 0.6116 0.4129 0.7611
21Table 7: Pairwise T-tests on Treatment E®ects
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
1 0
2 -0.04 0
3 1.15 1.14 0
4 0.17 0.20 -0.94 0
5 -0.35 -0.30 -1.44 -0.50 0
6 0.36 0.38 -0.80 0.17 0.69 0
7 1.53 1.51 0.39 1.31 1.80 1.18 0
8 1.32 1.30 0.13 1.09 1.61 0.95 -0.28 0
9 1.33 1.30 0.11 1.09 1.61 0.95 -0.30 -0.02 0
10 -0.12 -0.08 -1.20 -0.28 0.21 -0.46 -1.56 -1.36 -1.36 0
11 1.19 1.18 0.11 0.99 1.46 0.86 -0.27 -0.01 0.00 1.24 0
12 1.74 1.70 0.54 1.49 2.00 1.37 0.13 0.42 0.44 1.75 0.40 0
13 -0.71 -0.65 -1.76 -0.84 -0.35 -1.04 -2.10 -1.93 -1.94 -0.55 -1.76 -2.31 0
14 0.50 0.52 -0.59 0.32 0.81 0.17 -0.96 -0.73 -0.72 0.59 -0.66 -1.12 1.13 0
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Figure 7: Kaplan-Meyer survival probabilities and 95% con¯dence intervals for 2 cohorts of
19-24 year old in the ¯rst 6 months of unemployment
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Figure 8: Kaplan-Meyer survival probabilities and 95% con¯dence intervals (non treated)
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Figure 9: Kaplan-Meyer survival probabilities and 95% con¯dence intervals


















































Figure 10: New Deal participants (males)
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Figure 11: Hourly earnings (1995Q1 prices)
Source: LFS.
28